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Abstract 
The fall in economic output all over Europe that is linked to the economic and sovereign debt crisis 
since 2008 has had important consequences for household liabilities. Major growth in demand and 
supply for household credit products has generated an increase in household debt, which contributed to 
growth rates during the pre-crisis period but – in some countries – became household-debt overhangs 
and helped inflate asset bubbles. In the run-up to the crisis, long-term economic lessons and theories 
were often overlooked and signs that the economic situation could worsen were ignored. Although not 
at  the  core  of  the  crisis, household debt  had  important  consequences for  macroeconomic stability, 
robustness of growth and the depth of recessions. The last ten years in Europe have demonstrated the 
typical final stage of a household debt cycle: rapid increase and abrupt retrenchment. Widely varying 
outcomes across Europe enable us to consider the causes of the rapid growth in household debt and 
draw  theoretical  lessons  that  can  help  policy-makers  and  academics  devise  a  coherent  regulatory 
response to avoid extremes of the debt cycle in future. 
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Executive summary 
  Household debt was an important driver of growth during the pre-crisis period. The 
period  of  high  credit  expansion  was  not  limited  to  households  and  was  generally 
characterised  by  lower  credit  constraints  on  households  due  to  stable  inflation, 
decreasing risk premiums, the development of the Single Market in financial services, 
higher  and  more  differentiated  credit  supply,  higher  future-income  expectations, 
altering households’ life-income function. 
  In terms of household-debt development, on an aggregate level the EU did not go 
through a specific development of household debt. It can rather be divided into two 
groups. One in which the crisis did not have significant effect (very approximately 
describable as the EU core) and the other in which the credit-expansion slowed down 
or where households reduced their debt levels (EU periphery). 
  Both groups on average share some macroeconomic and other conditions, namely for 
the periphery higher inflation and lower real cost of credit before the crisis and more 
abrupt reaction to the financial crisis, most notably in unsecured loans. The relative 
indebtedness of households does not play a role in this classification. 
  There  is  a  clear  association  between  the  lower  real  cost  of  credit  and  the  credit 
expansion, although the overall economic situation and credit supply plays a more 
deterministic role. The demand for credit decreased in the later stages of the crisis 
despite falling interest rates. 
  The  EU  can  be  further  divided  into  two  different  groups  based  on  the  degree  of 
credit-market developments, largely covering the division between the old member 
states  (accession  before  2004)  and  the  new  ones.  The  new  member  states  have 
significantly lower debt levels both in absolute and relative terms and are catching 
up slowly. 
  This division has been reinforced by the crisis as many new member states decreased 
the  pace  of  household-credit  expansion  despite  their  relatively  low  household 
indebtedness.  New  member  states  differ  the  most  importantly  in  the  significantly 
higher cost of consumer credit, associated with higher risk premiums. 
  In  terms  of  market  convergence,  both  per capita  and  debt-to-income levels  of  EU 
countries  have  been  converging  in  the  past  ten  years  but  the  convergence  has 
decelerated during the crisis. 
  While the development of housing loans has been largely driven by its low cost as well 
as by a more diverse financial products, the expansion of consumer credit in the past 
ten  years  has  been  accelerated  by  changing  consumer  patterns  and  relatively  low 
market development during the preceding periods. With rare exceptions, consumer 
credit accumulated before the crisis has been now largely reduced towards the pre-
crisis levels across the EU, reflecting its higher flexibility and income sensitivity. 
  Despite the undisputed existence of on average highly leveraged households in some 
countries, the effects of reducing the debt burden during the crisis and thus has 
contributed  to  the  economic  downturn  through  effects  on  aggregate  demand, 
disallowing households to grow out of their debt-to-income levels, further deepening 
the economic downturn and contributing to the length of the recession. 2   ALES CHMELAR 
  Concerning  determinants  of  household-debt  reduction  after  the  crisis,  there  is  no 
significant  correlation  between  relative  indebtedness  of  households.  On  the 
contrary, the current household-debt reduction is highly associated with the degree 
of credit expansion in the pre-crisis period, suggesting a limited unstable character of 
household debt accumulated too quickly during economic boom times. 
  The main challenges of regulatory framework is to take into account the risks of a 
downturn parts of the debt cycle even during good times and avoid over-optimistic 
market  developments  associated  with  higher  risk  accumulation  and  lenience  on 
consumer solvency as well as comprehensive and sensitive information gathering and 
provision in order to facilitate sound credit decisions of both parties. 
1.  Introduction 
The capacity of households to optimise their cash flows during their life cycle has been a 
long-accepted central determinant of future household expenditure and economic growth.1 
Despite having a moderately negative effect on aggregate savings,2 household credit allows 
demand to expand in the short-term; increasing the immediate output and the potential for 
future growth. Nonetheless, over-leveraged households can be an impediment to long-term 
consumption, if spending in the short term and sub-optimal interest rates compromise future 
demand.3 More importantly, higher rates of  debt to income are clearly associated with  the 
higher sensitivity of households to changes in interest rates and  to  changes of  expected 
income.4 Put simply, the interplay between household debt and the economy is not univocal. 
The economic causes  and consequences depend intrinsically on the larger macroeconomic 
context.  
This macroeconomic context has been extremely volatile  in Europe over the last ten  years. 
European households  underwent  significant economic upheaval  during this  period;  they 
registered  record  income  increases,  translating  into  growth  rates  of  borrowing  and 
unprecedented subsequent retrenchment. These conditions provide a unique opportunity to 
look back at  the development of household debt  at this point and  assess what caused the 
quick expansion of household debt, whether its expansion was justified and how the stock of 
these liabilities behaves during the latter stages of the current debt cycle. Furthermore, the 
very heterogeneous European context allows us to identify specific idiosyncrasies, which do 
not always corroborate the theory.  
This report  looks at the  last ten years of the household  debt  cycle by  analysing  specific 
linkages of household debt and comparing them to other cyclical developments and relevant 
theories. The euphoria and subsequent pessimism that households in many countries went 
through in the past ten years  are put in a  broader context. The report  tries to  find a link 
between the various household debt developments in European countries and sketch a non-
exhaustive account of its expansion and retrenchment. It points to relevant debt theories and 
                                                       
1 Ando, A. & F. Modigliani (1963), “The ‘life cycle’ hypothesis of saving: Aggregate implications and tests”, 
The American Economic Review, 53(1), 55–84. 
Bacchetta, P. & S. Gerlach (1997), “Consumption and credit constraints: International evidence”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 40(2), 207–238. 
2 Barba, A. & M. Pivetti (2008), “Rising household debt: Its causes and macroeconomic implications  – a 
long-period analysis”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33(1), 113–137.  
3 Maki, Dean M. (2002), “The Growth of Consumer Credit and the Household Debt Service Burden”, The 
Impact of Public Policy on Consumer Credit, 43–68. 
4 Debelle, G. (2004), “Household debt and the macroeconomy”, BIS Quarterly Review, March, 51–64.  HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS   3 
 
specific characteristics of the European household debt market in the past ten years, which 
allowed this expansion – with both its positive and negative consequences for the economy. 
It aims to open up a debate about possible lessons offered by this recent experience and by 
the current last stage of a household-debt cycle in the European context. 
2.  Household-debt development 
Many EU member states experienced a moderate debt development during the early and 
mid-2000s. Many single countries, however, recorded a considerable rise in household debt 
in  the  period  preceding  the  financial  crisis,  especially  in  Southern  and  Eastern  Europe. 
Concurrently with the US, they were accumulating debt both in the corporate and household 
sector as a consequence of sizeable economic expansion and structural changes in monetary 
policy and financial markets. 
The  divergent  developments  between  European  countries  generally  reflect  the  different 
macroeconomic situations during the crisis, but also structural differences and the maturity 
of the household-debt markets. Error! Reference source not found. illustrates the extreme 
ifferences in the development of household debt among the EU member states. The figure 
allows assessing both relative and absolute changes in household debt during the crisis and 
comparison of the relative development of credit markets of given countries (note the rapid 
development from virtually nil values in the majority of new member states). 
Figure 1. Total of household debt in real values (2010 euros) and leverage to disposable income 
between 2003 and 2012 
 
Source: ECRI, ECB. 
Note: On vertical scale, the graphs are plotted between zero and a maximum level of debt. The inclusion of zero as 
minimum  of  the  scale  allows  us  to  distinguish  countries  with  clearly  under-developed  credit  markets  to 
households. 4   ALES CHMELAR 
Based on the these plots, the development in household-debt trends during the crisis can be 
separated into two approximate groups: i) countries in which the debt expansion has not 
slowed down substantially during the crisis or has even accelerated after a small or no initial 
retrenchment,5 and ii) countries in which the crisis has had clear effects on the speed of 
expansion or where debt has been reduced.6 The developments of household debt among 
countries correlate significantly within each group, indicating  that the two groups follow 
similar and specific household debt trends.  
With some exceptions, the groups depicted above can also be referred to as i) Europe’s core 
and  ii)  periphery  in  political  terms  and  rather  unorthodox  terms.  This  evidence  of  EU 
member states being clearly divided into two groups of differing trends in household debt 
renders  the  widely  applied  assessment  of  aggregate  data  on  EU27  level  inadequate  and 
partly explains the seemingly erratic development of debt levels and leverage data in Europe 
as a whole (see Figure 2). 
In countries referred to as the European periphery, the development of household debt both 
prior  to  and  during  the  crisis  has  been  unprecedented  in  their  economic  histories.  The 
emergence of a wide range of new credit products to households in the past 20 years and the 
record  expansion  of  home  ownership  in  the  same  period  in  these  countries  have  had  a 
tremendous  effect  on  household  leverage.  Between  1995  and  2007,  the  overall  stock  of 
household debt in the EU expanded almost three times, while in countries with significant 
real-estate expansion, such as in Ireland or Spain, the debt expanded as much as six-fold.  
Figure 2. Real household debt per capita by type (left scale) and leverage to gross disposable income 
(right scale) in EU i) ‘Core’ and ii) ‘Periphery’ 
 
Sources: ECRI, ECB, Eurostat. 
Also relative to disposable income, household debt in countries experiencing the strongest 
asset price bubbles increased significantly – more than by the moderate EU average of 50%. 
                                                       
5 i) Austria (AT), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE)), Finland (FI), France (FR), Italy (IT), 
Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NE), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK) and Sweden (SE). 
6 ii) Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Greece (EL), Spain (ES), Hungary (HU), 
Ireland (IE), Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), United Kingdom (UK). HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS   5 
 
For example, in Ireland, household debt to disposable income went from 49 to 161% in the 
ten years preceding the crisis.7 
However, despite similar developments in a range of European countries within the above-
mentioned groups, the classification conceals significantly differing levels of  debt leverage, 
also within the groups. In 2011, household debt to disposable income in Romania is as low as 
34%, while in Denmark it is as much as 264%.  
2.1  Explaining the expansion 
The credit expansion in the early to mid-2000s was not specific to the household sector. The 
non-financial companies and sovereign states registered a comparable rise in leverage during 
the same period, often sharing the same causes. Economic growth, the establishment of the 
single market in financial services, the expansion of credit products and falling interest rates 
have facilitated access to all types of credit across Europe. 
The rapid economic growth before the crisis across Europe – and, more significantly, in its 
periphery  –  was  helped  by  the  positive  spill-over  effects  of  European  integration,  most 
notably through the newly established single market and the drop in interest rates associated 
with euro membership. This overall positive economic environment coincided with initially 
low household debt to income in the new member states and some peripheral European 
countries. There was therefore both scope for catch-up and an economic situation that was 
prone to provide it. The steadily decreasing inflation of the past thirty years in Europe also 
encouraged higher credit provisions as the supply of funding through increased and the 
perceived risk associated with variable interest rates was reduced. The development of the 
single  market  in  financial  services,  which  kicked  off  in  1999  with  the  Financial  Services 
Action Plan, also had a significant effect on the cost of credit across Europe as it facilitated 
the recognition of banking companies across the EU and thus increased competition. 
The  easing  of  credit  constraints  induced  by  the  long-term  macroeconomic  stability  and 
market  developments  added  to  a  larger  picture  of  global  financial  deregulation,8  which 
translated rather early into European legislative frameworks, most importantly through the 
liberalisation of European mortgage markets.9 Overall, liquidity constraints on households 
dropped substantially between  the  1990s and early 2000s .10  Due to similar business and 
marketing development patterns, European households on average tended to move towards 
the credit behaviour of their US counterparts, despite large internal differences.11 
The positive economic conditions had a direct  effect on the behaviour and risk appetite of 
households. Following the life-cycle theory of Ando & Modigliani,12 decreasing interest rates 
result in increases in the discount rate  in the future. When combined with high future 
income expectations, the perceived net value over  a lifetime and therefore the optimistic 
view of future capacity or repayment  increases even further. As Brown et al. (2005) hav e 
demonstrated, in the case of British households such expectations do not reflect actual future 
                                                       
7 Unless stated otherwise, all data come from the ECRI Statistical Package 2013: Lending to Households 2013.  
8 Barrell, R., E. Davis, T. Fic & A. Orazgani (2009), “Household Debt and Foreign Currency Borrowing in 
New Member States of the EU”, Economics and Finance Working Paper, Brunel University, 09. 
9 Girouard, N. & S. Blöndal (2001), House prices and economic activity, OECD, Paris. 
10 Debelle, G. (2004), “Household debt and the macroeconomy”, BIS Quaterly Review, March, 51–64.  
11 Barba, A. & M. Pivetti (2008), “Rising household debt: Its causes and macroeconomic implications – a 
long-period analysis”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33(1), 113–137. 
12 Ando, A. & F. Modigliani (1963), “The ‘life cycle’ hypothesis of saving: Aggregate implications and tests”, 
The American Economic Review, 53(1), 55–84. 6   ALES CHMELAR 
income  but  rather  an  immediate  subjective  feeling  of  optimism  about  the  future.13  Long 
periods of sustained  growth  accompanied by the easing of credit constrain ts  therefore 
overshadow the likelihood of a possible downturn of business cycles, strongly affecting the 
susceptibility of households to take on credit  and further fuelling the economy  and thus 
income expectations.14  
The loop of long periods of economic growth and high-income expectations tends to increase 
the likelihood, almost exponentially, of households taking on more credit, which increases 
asset prices, bringing about the peak of the leverage  cycle and also fuelling the culmination 
point of the business cycle.  Therefore, not only falling liquidity constraints and the general 
availability of credit, but  also  the cyclical character of the economy itself tend to inflate 
household debt levels that are almost by definition  transformed into a debt overhang in the 
long term, if we assume that income cannot rise at the same or accelerating pace indefinitely. 
Although such an increase in debt during boom times would not be problematic per se, high 
household leverage has structurally destabilising macroeconomic effects. Firstly, due to a 
large part of their portfolios being dependent on interest rates, households become more 
sensitive to their changes; with consequences for macroeconomic volatility. Secondly, with 
higher  reliance  on  credit  and  more  life-cycle  optimisation,  households  –  as  the  ultimate 
spenders of the economy – also become more sensitive to expected future income. A small 
future-income  change  under  high  leverage  can  have  potentially  large  repercussions  on 
implicit life-cycle assumptions of individual consumers. The higher the relative debt level, 
the higher the risk that interest rate and expected income changes result in abrupt changes in 
consumption  patterns,  therefore  increasing  the  potential  drop  in  demand  during  an 
economic  crisis  and  preparing  the  ground  for  a  deeper  recession  in  countries  with  high 
household leverage. 
2.2  The cost of credit to households during the crisis 
Within the groups detailed above, a large set of macroeconomic factors were reflected in 
European economies in a different ways. Most importantly for the household debt leverage, 
the drop in interest rates since the late 1990s had a crucial effect on newly contracted debt of 
households as the clear co-movement of interest rates with debt growth suggests (see Annex, 
Table 1). The low or even negative real interest rates have been often singled out as one of 
the major causes of extensive household debt expansion, often linked to deficient monetary 
transmission of the single interest rate set by the European Central Bank.15 
Discounted for domestic inflation, the three-month Euribor in some peripheral countries has 
indeed experienced consistently negative values, effectively translating into negative interest 
rates. Concerning the credit finance available to households, however, the picture of negative 
borrowing costs is not as clear as  stylised facts would suggest. With the exception of high-
inflation periods in  Bulgaria and the Baltic countries, 16 the annual  percentage rate charge 
                                                       
13 In a large sample of UK households, Brown et al. have demonstrated that people positive of their future 
income held six times and fifteen times more debt than households pessimistic of their future income in 
1995 and 2000 respectively. The results were relevant, even after controlling for income. Such expectations 
did not corroborate actual income changes, as reported in subsequent surveys. 
14 Brown, S., G. Garino, K. Taylor & S.W. Price (2005), “Debt and Financial Expectations: An Individual- and 
Household-Level Analysis”, Economic Inquiry, 43(1), 100–120. 
15 Krugman, P. (2012), “Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2012, Vol. 
27, 1–15. 
16 Since all Baltic countries and Bulgaria had their currencies pegged to the euro, this development would 
give reason to the effects of the exchange rates on negative exchange rates, being susceptible to the Balassa -HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS   7 
 
(APRC)  kept  its  values  nil  or  positive  (see  Figure  4).  Even  in  countries  with  the  most 
significant real-estate bubbles in the euro area context (Spain and Ireland) real mortgage 
APRC was indeed virtually zero during the pre-crisis period, but not consistently negative.  
When observing real interest rates in the region identified above as having more volatile 
household-debt  development  in  previous  years  (the  approximate  periphery),  the  interest 
rates were on balance only moderately lower in the pre-crisis periods, as reported in Figure 
3.  This  finding  indicates  that  interest  rates  on  their  own  cannot  explain  the  significant 
differentiation in the rise of household debt, but rather refers to the overall economic boom 
and other effects causing the appreciation of assets ordinarily used as collateral. 
During the initial stages of the crisis, the core countries’ real cost of credit saw very little 
change. This was less the case in the periphery. Since households with high leverage are 
likely to react excessively to changes in interest rates, the relatively high rise in consumer-
credit real interest rates in the period between late 2008 and early 2010 would explain the 
very rapid initial adjustment of the consumer credit in the periphery, as well as the relative 
calm at the core. 
Although non-negligible, the difference in interest rates cannot explain, however, the extent 
of the differentiated situation across Europe in its entirety. The cost of consumer credit was 
comparable  in  both  country  groups  described  above,  while  the  peripheral  countries 
registered a more significant temporary rise in consumer-credit stocks during the pre-crisis 
period.  Future  maturity  of  the  market,  income  expectations  and  self-enforcing  optimism 
appear therefore to affect credit expansion as much as market forces and the cost of credit. 
Figure 3. Real Annual Percentage Rate (APR) in EU periphery and core (stock-weighted averages) 
 
Sources: ECRI, ECB. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Samuelson effect  of naturally higher inflation, especially if such countries are catching up in economic 
terms. 8   ALES CHMELAR 
The pro-active monetary policy helped to keep APRC low after the initial surge starting in 
late 2008 as a consequence of a global credit crunch. The borrowing rates, nonetheless, kept 
falling from 2009 onwards, despite the decreasing cost of credit, thus confirming that future 
growth expectations and other cyclical effects are on balance more critical in determining 
household debt development than the supply or cost of credit itself. 
There is also a clear asymmetry in the differential between the periphery and the core in 
terms of credit type. While consumer-credit real APRC in the periphery registers similar or 
higher levels than in the core, mortgage loans are similar or lower. Such development is on a 
general level a combination of higher inflation in the periphery countries with higher risk 
premiums on unsecured loans in the periphery. More importantly, however, the spreads in 
consumer-loans’ APRC increased after the crisis, reflecting the worsening economic situation 
in the periphery. In this respect, the development of unsecured consumer credit followed a 
similar pattern to the case of loans to non-financial companies (i.e. the spread with the core 
rose), while mortgage APRC remained low in the periphery or even lower than in the core, 
despite the rising risk of the markets. 
Furthermore,  the  indisputable  correlation  between  interest  rates  and  effective  borrowing 
would  suggest  that  deleveraging  would  have  proceeded  faster  if  it  was  not  for  the 
intervention of central banks and  resulting lower interest rates.  Moreover, lower interest 
rates are therefore also partially caused by the fall in newly contracted loans as competition 
for a shrinking market decreases margins. While the effects of the crisis on interest rates were 
lower due to this monetary expansion and a lower demand for credit, the spreads between 
values of consumer credit and housing-loan interest rates have risen substantially (see Figure 
4), most significantly in the peripheral regions. The underlying logic is one of increasing the 
risk-premium of non-secured loans as the economic situation deteriorates. In other words, 
the deterioration in the economic situation of households has naturally increased the risk 
premium on loans without collateral, therefore raising the average interest rates for – largely 
unsecured – consumer credit. HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS   9 
 
Figure 4. Real consumer credit and housing loan APRC in EU27 
 
 
Sources: ECRI, ECB. 
 
2.3  The four-tier Europe of household debt 
While  policy  initiatives  such  as  the  single  market  and  the  common  currency  had  an 
immediate  effect  on  European  economies,  their  underlining  heterogeneous  character  has 
partly  explained  the  very  divergent  effects  of  similar  cyclical  phenomena.  Inflation 
propensity,  the  social  acceptance  of  short-term  debt,  consumer-default  proceedings,  the 
maturity of the market or, for instance, home-ownership ranging from 42% in Germany to 
97% in Bulgaria, all prepared a heterogeneous breeding ground for the effects of household 
debt during the boom and the bust. Due to the dissimilarity of EU economies, comparable 
cyclical phenomena had strikingly different effects on households and their debt despite – or, 
indeed, because of – the advanced market and effective monetary integration. As much as 
the  common  currency,  legislative  convergence  or  harmonisation  in  terms  of  credit 
provisioning to households could also have potentially very divergent repercussions. It is 
therefore essential to identify the main stakes of this European heterogeneity.  
Besides  the  approximate  division  between  the  European  core  and  periphery  introduced 
above in respect to mortgage and consumer credit penetration, the European continent could 
also  be  divided  into  two  distinct  groups  in  terms  of  past  economic  development  and 
household-credit markets’ maturity. New member states (accession after 2004), presented 
Consumer credit 
Housing credit 
Interval -2%/8% 
Value 4% 10   ALES CHMELAR 
substantially  lower  levels  of  household  indebtedness  than  old  member  states  and 
correspondingly  much  higher  rates  of  credit  expansion  before  the  crisis  (see  Figure  5). 
Compared  to  this  group,  even  maturing  peripheral  old  member  states  have  registered 
relatively low rates of household-debt build-up. 
Figure 5. Real household debt per capita and leverage to gross disposable income in new and old 
member states 
 
Sources: ECRI, ECB, Eurostat. 
When the Central and Eastern European countries emerged from being centrally planned 
economic  systems,  credit  markets  in  their  Western  form  barely  existed.  Credit  providers 
were state-managed, credit was rationed according different criteria from solvency and the 
price of real estate was kept low by housing policies and price regulation. 
The levels of household leverage of Eastern European countries in early 1990s were roughly 
comparable  with  those  in  post-war  Western  Europe,  characterised  by  low  mortgage 
penetration  and  virtually  non-existent  consumer  credit.  Contrary  to  post-war  Europe, 
however, financial institutions existed in the Western markets and were able and willing to 
provide credit to these emerging markets, albeit with a higher risk premium, reflecting the 
opportunity in the immature markets to establish their activities.  
The availability of credit supply was significant in the early stages of transition in the current 
new  member  states.  The  recession  accompanying  the  economic  transition;  high  inflation 
linked to price liberalisation and consolidating monetary policy, exchange-rate volatility and 
overall economic instability were, however, not a good prerequisite for stable and easily 
predictable  lending.  Financial  institutions  therefore  appropriately  adjusted  their  interest 
rates to the regional risk premiums. The cost of household loans, especially consumer credit, 
is significantly higher in new member states than in the old ones (see Figure 6), suggesting 
higher risk premiums but also lower competition and higher non-rate fees on short-term 
loans.  The  surprisingly  low  cost  of  housing  loans,  on  the  other  hand,  reflects  the  low 
maturity of real-estate markets compared to the West and therefore potentially high returns 
in the case of future asset liquidation by the lender. This was not the case for unsecured 
consumer credit, which remained loans risky and therefore costly. HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS   11 
 
Figure 6. New and old member states real interest rates (weighted by stocks) 
 
Source: ECRI, ECB. 
One  way  for  consumers  in  new  member  states  to  circumvent  higher  interest  rates  on 
domestically-denominated debt was to contract debt in the foreign currency of a financially 
stable  country  with  liquid  asset  markets,  where  financial  institutions  could  finance 
themselves easily (before the creation of the common currency mostly the Deutschmark and 
Swiss Franc; euros in subsequent periods). In boom times, foreign-currency loans were not 
destabilising.  On  the  contrary,  foreign-currency  loans  were  an  opportunity  not  only  to 
borrow at lower rates but also, in countries with floating exchange rate, to speculate on the 
high probability of rising unit-labour costs in developing Eastern European economies, and 
thus on the appreciation of domestic currencies. This supposition turned out to be false in the 
long term, however, and soon transformed into a systemic risk element and contributed to 
the depth of the recession in new member states, which reinforced the overall divergence of 
European household-credit markets. 
The  high  ‘euroisation’  and  ‘francisation’  of  households’  liabilities  in  Eastern  Europe 
generated a shock to the new member state economies, as their currencies fell, 17 generating a 
substantial increase in nominal interest rates and large losses for households in the most 
exposed  countries.  Exposure  to  foreign-currency  loans  subsequently  decreased  but 
nevertheless contributed substantially to macroeconomic instability in new member states. 
The rapid rise in the cost of consumer credit had detrimental effects on consumption. 
2.4  Converging or diverging? 
The rapid expansion of household debt in the new member states has also been viewed as an 
expected and on balance healthy catch-up process and convergence of consumption patterns. 
The catch-up process of debt to gross disposable income (GDI) – or leverage – is, however, 
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not convincing in this respect. Firstly, although new member states have been increasing 
their  household  debt  quickly  in  relative  (percentage)  terms  to  their  initial  base,  mature 
Western and Southern European markets have been increasing their household debt even 
more rapidly in absolute terms (in net flows) and in some instances even in relative terms (to 
GDI).  
Another element of the perceived convergence was the story of Southern European countries 
(i.e. Spain, Greece and Portugal) that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s from specific politico-
economic systems and started to catch up in terms of household debt during the 1990s. In the 
early to mid-2000s, however, this convergence of debt to income started to stagnate on the 
EU level, as those countries exceeded the mean leverage of other old member states and 
continued to grow in a largely speculative way until the crisis. The effect of this divergence 
was  partially  eliminated  during  the  recession  due  to  higher  deleveraging  efforts  in  the 
peripheral countries, the divergence has slowed down in the later stages of the crisis and the 
trend remains very weak (see Figure 7). 
Figure 7. The relative standard deviation (RSD) of debt to GDI (leverage) and household debt 
per capita between 2003 and 2012 
  
Sources: ECRI, ECB, Eurostat. 
Notes: The RSD is a standard measure of relative variance; its decreasing value implies convergence. The grey 
area illustrates the span between the lowest and the highest degree of leverage (debt to GDI) in EU 27. 
3.  Run-up to the crisis 
Although the development of EU aggregate household debt cannot be described as a bubble 
(Figure 8), the stocks of debt within the EU tell a different story, as demonstrated in the 
preceding chapter. Household debt expanded substantially mainly in less mature markets, 
where it therefore contributed more to the economic growth during the pre-crisis period. 
Beyond factors already described, a closer look at credit types demonstrated the underlining 
logic of this differentiated development. HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS   13 
 
Figure 8. Real household debt per capita by type and debt to GDI (leverage) in EU27 
between 2003 and 2012 
 
Source: ECRI, ECB, Eurostat. 
3.1  Specific characteristics of the housing-credit expansion 
Real estate bubbles are generally less frequent than stock market bubbles, but the market 
inflexibility and the structural changes that they introduce to the economy during the build-
up make them more severe in terms of consequences. Numerous causes contributed to the 
expansion of mortgage markets between the late 1990s and mid-2000s. Among the economic, 
psychological  and  interest-rate  related  conditions  already  mentioned,  which  improved 
steadily in the period, the low maturity of some mortgage markets, which were catching up 
in peripheral economies, contributed to the general perception that housing-loan expansion 
is a sign of a general European convergence and household empowerment. 
A significant contributing factor was the rise in the supply of varied mortgage products and 
the overall higher availability of housing credit.18 With the development of securitisation, the 
potential pool of mortgage investors increased radically , as did the supply and variety of 
mortgage products to channel  such investments. The establishment of the European single 
market in financial services has also been a contributing factor in increasing competition and 
thus decreasing the cost of mortgage products and thus pushing  up the amount of housing 
loans. Across Western Europe, the growth in features such as long -term, interest-only and 
100% loan-to-value contributed to the lowering instalments on households, especially in the 
initial periods of mortgages, thereby increasing the potential pool of borrowers. As prices of 
collateral assets rose, the perceived riskiness of mortgages also decreased, allowing for lower 
down-payments, higher loan-to-value ratios and overall reduced requirements for income, 
since the risk of foreclosure constituted less of a strain on the quality of security and could be 
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redeemed at lower stages once the collateral was liquidated, supposedly at a higher market 
price. The required declaration of multiple annual incomes and thus the long-term solvency 
of the borrower was substituted by requirements regarding the appropriateness of monthly 
income  to  instalment  payments;  effectively  reducing  the  capacity  to  take  into  account 
unemployment or income shock risks. This led to a higher number of mortgage loans but is 
associated with intrinsically higher risk. 
The quintessential boom-time-only mortgage product available to European households in 
many countries has been the interest-only housing loan. The fact that principal is not being 
repaid under this product and that instalments were thus significantly lower than under a 
usual mortgage, encouraged more speculative property purchases and contributed to the 
inflation of asset prices and, in turn, to the perceived sustainability of expanding mortgage 
markets.  If  asset  prices  were  to  rise,  an  interest-only  mortgage  is  a  great  source  of 
investment, while risks are low if the borrower keeps its long-term solvency. If, however, 
income or prices of collateral fall, the repercussions both on the lender and on the creditor 
are proportionally greater. The expansion of such products had a naturally weakening effect 
on  the  real  estate  market  and  the  economy  as  non-traditional  and  more  sophisticated 
mortgage products have generally higher propensity to default.19 
Households are usually the main  mortgage contractors, purchasers of real estate and the 
initiators of high asset prices and of the debt expansion.  However, asset prices have been 
driven significantly by the exponential growth in real estate and construction industries. For 
instance in Spain, unlike in Ireland, the mortgage expansion has not been as significant  on 
the parts of households. Significant drivers of real-estate prices and housing-loans in Spain 
have been construction and development companies, i.a. responding to foreign demand for 
real estate destined for recreational purposes.20 The speculative character of housing loans by 
non-financial companies is underlined by the high ratio of subsequent non-performing loans 
in the real-estate development sector. 
Even though the Europe-wide rise in availability of housing credit has not been as driven by 
political considerations as in the  US, housing affordability has become part of political 
discourse in the past 20 years, starting in the UK and expanding to continental Europe at the 
turn of the century. The political sensitivity of housing and home  ownership had played a 
non-negligible  role  in  the  expansion ,  also  considering  the  expenditure  res traints  of 
governments.  Promotion  of  house  ownership,  tax  exemptions  and  legislative  relief  on 
mortgages were a seemingly cost-efficient alternative to other provisions with similar goals, 
such as social housing. 
Concerning possible effects of the unstable housing debt on the banking sector, the picture 
also varies. In countries such as Ireland,  the burst of the real-estate bubble and subsequent 
high household-default ratios put substantial  strain on  the banks’ assets and their overall 
solvency. This meant that the household credit bubble had direct consequences on the rise in 
government debt as a result of support for the banking sector. In other countries, however, 
the direct effect of delinquent household debt was lower during the first stages of the crisis 
when household default ratios were kept relatively low.  
                                                       
19 Lin, C.-C., L.J. Prather, T.-H. Chu & J.-T. Tsay (2013), “Differential default risk among traditional and non-
traditional mortgage products and capital adequacy standards”, International Review of Financial Analysis, 
27(0), 115–122. 
20 Conefrey, T. & J. Gerald (2010), “Managing housing bubbles in regional economies under EMU: Ireland 
and Spain”, National Institute Economic Review. HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS   15 
 
3.2  Consumer credit 
Many microeconomic studies prove that households with mortgage credit are more prone to 
take  on  a  consumer  loan,  although  if  controlled  for  household  income,  the  effects  are 
somehow less tangible.21 There are good reasons to believe that the increase of mortgage 
credits  had  a  knock-on  effect  on  the  consumer  credit  as  households  increased  their 
expenditure  on  housing  equipment  and  accessories.  In  addition,  mortgages  increase 
awareness of financial products and put households more  at ease with a financial liability, 
thereby generating potential for smaller amounts of consumer credit. 
Considering  the  greater  flexibility  of  consumer  credit  and  lower  principal  sums,  i t  is 
therefore  not  surprising  that  c onsumer  credit  went  through  an  even  more  radical 
development than  housing loans. Between 1995 and the peak in 2008, the real amount of 
consumer  credit  expanded  by  approximately  150%   in  Europe,  while  the  US  market 
consumer-credit market grew by only 60% during the same period, although from a much 
higher level. The rapid development of consumer-credit markets has facilitated access to 
short-term loans, which played an increasing role in European households’ portfolios during 
the boom years.  
The same causal logic mentioned in the preceding chapters also applies to consumer credit. 
Lower interest rates, more financial products, larger investment pool due to securitisation, 
new  distributional  channels  as  well  as  increasing  convenience  of  credit  all  increased  the 
potential  of  credit  supply  and  demand.  The  credit-card  market  has  been  expanding  at 
extraordinary rates as their development was relatively delayed in comparison with the US, 
contributing to the higher rates of consumer-credit growth in Europe. In Britain, Italy or 
Greece, the stock of credit card debt increased more than five times during the ten years 
before the crisis, while credit-card debt in the US increased just two fold during the same 
period. 
Such expansion before the crisis was critical to promoting consumption since spending was 
no longer conditioned by the immediate liquidity constraints but rather – in an ideal case – 
by  the  long-term  solvency  of  consumers  who  optimise  their  short-term  cash  flows.  This 
rendered personal finance management more efficient, avoided small-scale liquidity traps, 
further lessening the liquidity constraints of households, thus encouraging economic growth 
in boom times. 
Although  consumer  credit  is  often  the  focal  point  of  discussions  on  over-indebtedness, 
mainly  due  its  higher  accessibility  compared  to  mortgage  credit,  its  contribution  to  the 
overall  household  indebtedness  and  the  exposure  to  credit  markets  in  Europe  is  almost 
negligible. At its peak in 2009, consumer credit represented just over 13% of household debt 
in  the  euro  area,  including  partially  collateralised  leasing  credit,  while  housing  loans 
represented 72%. 
The high sensitivity of consumer credit to GDP and even more so to income expectations (see 
Annex) meant that the perceived overhang of consumer credit has been largely reduced or 
eliminated in countries where it expanded substantially in the early 2000s (see Figure 9). 
More importantly, the association between pre-crisis credit expansion and the consequent 
retrenchment shows that its growth in many countries during boom times was fragile and 
based on over-optimistic expectations (see Chapter 4.1). In countries with a longer tradition 
of consumer credit, the reduction has been substantially lower, implying a higher financial 
maturity of consumers and a rather different approach to consumer credit based on cash-
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flow optimisation more than short-termism and betting on higher future income. Such a 
different underlying nature of consumer credit should also be taken into consideration when 
analysing any legislative measures for consumer credit. 
Figure 9. Real values of consumer credit (line) in EU27 and consumer credit to gross disposable 
income at peak levels (shades and percentage) 
 
Source: ECRI, ECB 
4.  Deleveraging – dangerous or necessary? 
As highly leveraged households are more sensitive to changes in income and interest rates,22 
systematically significant shocks to the economy have   a  stronger  impact  on  households’ 
financial stability and consumption in countries with high household debt. It could therefore 
be expected that economic crises have greater impact on countries with a higher potential 
drop in demand and investment as well as banking sector destabilisation due to higher loan 
delinquency. 
Although  involvement  of  household  indebtedness  in  bringing  about  the  double-dip 
recession that hit most of Europe in 2009, and subsequently in late 2011, was negligible, 
lower disposable income had a disproportionate impact on household consumption, since 
the  ratio  of  debt  service  to  income  increased.  In  the  same  vein,  the  adjustment  to  new 
expected  income  reduced  the  usual  consumption  pattern  and  led  to  substantially  lower 
domestic demand for goods and services, creating deflationary pressure and deepening the 
recession.  In  this  theoretical  framework,  household  debt  overhang  indeed  has  a  clearly 
negative  effect  during  crises  and  the  largely  positive  economic  effect  of  household  debt 
expansion before the crisis has thus largely detrimental effects on consumption during the 
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recession.23 In a context of fiscal consolidation and government unwillingness or incapacity 
to  take  on  more  debt  to  sustain  the  economic  activity  and  smoothen  the  downturn, 
households’  deleveraging  efforts  even  coincided  with  an  economically  difficult  period 
during  which  investments  were  postponed  as  neither  private  nor  public  demand  could 
guarantee  returns,  largely  contributing  to  the  fiscal-retrenchment  multiplier  recently 
adjusted by the IMF.24 
While credit has a clearly positive effect on the short-term growth with positive spillovers for 
the future, generating substantial multipliers, it is also associated with long-term concerns of 
excessive debt accumulation. Even in economically peaceful times, excessive debt overhangs 
can strain on economy if the debt service becomes too detrimental to consumption. Research 
on the effects of  a  too high debt-to-GDP ratio has found  a  largely positive association 
between household credit and economic growth. Cecchetti et al. (2011) 25 calculated a very 
approximate estimate of debt values upon which the debt can become detrimental to GDP 
growth.  They observed a reversal in the positive association between household debt and 
GDP growth at a debt-to-GDP ratio of 85%. Such research has, however, recently been put in 
doubt26 and should therefore be considered with  the utmost precaution. More importantly, 
the association between high debt to income and slower economic growth does not imply a 
direct causality.  
In the European context, only Cyprus, Denmark,  the Netherlands and the UK attain levels 
identified by Cecchetti et al. , with  Portugal  and  Spain  ranking close  below.  More than 
nominal  values  of  such  limits  per  se, however,  the  main  conclusion  is  that  there  are 
theoretical optimum debt levels – although most probably varying and relative – that are 
most likely to sustain maximum economic growth and that at a certain level, debt overhang 
could  be  detrimental  to  the  economy.  The  most  intuitive  question  would  therefore  be 
whether an immediate deleveraging would be the right thing to do in order to foster higher 
growth. 
Such  a  conclusion  would  be  rather  doubtful,  on  the  one  hand  due  to  the  self-enforcing 
multiplier effects that household deleveraging has on demand and, on the other, due to the 
incapacity of the state to sustain demand through higher expenditure, as is often the case 
during less severe recessions. More importantly, as is mentioned in the subsequent chapters 
of this report, perceived sustainable levels of household debt can vary substantially between 
countries.  It  is  therefore  not  clear  where  the  debt  overhang  is  of  detrimental  value  to 
economic growth. 
Furthermore, quick household-credit retrenchment under the recession can actually lead to 
an even deeper recession, thereby further destabilising household income and the extent of 
negative effects of household-debt overhang.27 Successful deleveraging after the build-up of 
debt overhangs generally proceeds during recovery (Roxburgh et al. 2012), which allows the 
household to partly reduce their nominal debt and partly grow out of the excessive leverage. 
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A different way for the household sector to reduce their debt is to shift the cost onto the 
financial sector and ultimately onto the government or the lender of last resort. In countries 
with a low enforceability of evictions and more debtor-centred personal insolvency rules, a 
non-negligible part of the debt overhang was eliminated through personal defaults. Unlike 
Spain and Portugal, where the ratio of delinquent loans was kept at very low levels between 
2  and  4%,  in  Ireland  and  Greece  this  de  facto  elimination  occurred  due  to  high  non-
performing  loan  ratios of  12  and  14%  respectively.28  While the effect on consumption in 
Ireland was potentially tangible and could have helped the  household sector to pick up, the 
context of the deep recession in Greece does not allow a similar conclusion. 
4.1  Perceived household-debt sustainability levels 
It is a stylised fact that there is a relationship between debt sustainability and the output of 
the  economy  or  the  disposable  income  of  households.  As  expectations  of  future  growth 
decrease, we might anticipate a lowering of debt to income, especially in countries with high 
debt-to-income  ratios.  This  is,  however,  not  what  is  happening  during  the  ongoing 
deleveraging episode. 
In the past four years of low growth and recessions, households with the biggest leverage in 
the EU27 do not necessarily reduce their debt levels more than those with a lower one. The 
relationship between debt reduction as a reaction to the crisis and the overall leverage levels 
in  the  EU  is  statistically  insignificant  (see  Figure  10).  This  implies  a  counterintuitive 
conclusion  that,  at  least  in  macroeconomic  terms,  households  do  not  reduce  their  debt 
because  they  are  too  indebted.  Instead,  the  main  indicator  of  debt-overhang  reduction 
appears to be its recent build-up with a highly significant correlation. 
Figure 10. Rates of household-debt growth during the crisis (2009-2012) in relation to debt pre-crisis 
expansion (2003-2007) and to household debt-to-GDI ratio  
 
This sheds light on two major problems of household debt development before and during 
the crisis. It is not the level of debt that determines the necessity to reduce the debt; it is 
rather the perception of the sustainability of debt, determined significantly by the time when 
the debt has built up. It also shows that debt-reduction cannot be dictated or determined by 
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pointing to single ratios to GDP or to disposable income. The perceived or real sustainability 
of debt levels depend on different variables than income per se. 
Two  conclusions  could  be  drawn  from  this  argumentation.  Either  the  debt  levels  were 
sustainable  but  the  culture  of  higher  debt  did  not  have  time  to  adjust  to  new  income 
expectations, or the exuberance of credit expansion before the crisis was irrational and the 
credit taken out was not sufficiently consolidated in household portfolios. It does not imply 
that the bulk of the credit expansion before the crisis was speculative in nature, but rather 
that  it  was  the  result  of  an  over-optimistic  reaction  to  lower  credit  constraints  and  that 
indeed  could  be  depicted  as  subconsciously  speculating  on  –  ex  post  unrealistic  –  future 
income. 
5.  Conclusion: Lessons from the crisis 
Household debt in Europe was an important driver of economic growth until the mid-2000s. 
On the other hand, debt overhang and the contraction of demand has been just as important 
an impediment to the return of growth. Both lenders and borrowers had not sufficiently 
accounted for the risk that the business cycle would shift downwards. Therefore, one lesson 
to be drawn from the recent crisis is the inappropriate income expectation related to future 
growth, which ultimately led to borrowing and lending based on ill-informed or irrational 
income expectations, and subsequently to over-indebted households and a highly leveraged 
population. 
The financial crisis has indeed emphasised the focus of EU legislators on better facilitating 
responsible lending and borrowing. This is reflected in the review of the Consumer Credit 
Directive  (CCD)  as  well  as  in  the  Commission’s  Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  Credit 
Agreements Related to Residential Property, generally referred to as the Mortgage Credit 
Directive (MCD). The European Commission is also undertaking several assessments of how 
to ease and prevent household over-indebtedness. 
The lessons from the financial crisis can at least partially be acknowledged through revision 
of  both  the  legal  and  market  environment  in  which  the  European  participants  of  the 
household  credit  process  operate.  Both  the  CCD  and  the  forthcoming  MCD  include 
provisions important for pricing, advertising, information to be provided to the consumer, to 
name but a few. Because of the significant implications of the crisis on European households 
with  mortgages,  the  Commission  Proposal  for  the  MCD  includes  provisions  of  special 
importance for the post-financial crisis household credit market. For instance, its provisions 
directed towards mortgage brokers are crucial to prevent the moral hazard brought about by 
the practice of quick securitisation, under which brokers are commensurately less liable for 
the long-term soundness of their deal if the risk is quickly passed on to a widely dispersed 
pool  of  investors,  therefore  absolving  the  brokers  of  the  large  part  of  the  risk,  while 
preserving the profits of a newly contracted deal. The requirement to provide the consumer 
with full and clear information prior to the contract also has an important implication, not 
just in increasing consumer financial literacy per se, but in informing of the probability of 
interest rate fluctuations in the course of the whole business cycle to realise the risks of 
economic downturn. This is an essential part of preventing the detrimental effects of varying 
interest rates and of foreign-currency loans in mortgages, effectively distorting the rational 
expectations of consumers. 
Tackling household over-indebtedness through legislation is a rather problematic mission, 
however, given its complex and abstract nature. To this date, no definition of household 
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measures to address it. Household over-indebtedness is a combination of several household 
problems brought about by the crisis, including unemployment, unexpected drops in real 
income and welfare retrenchment. Furthermore, household over-indebtedness should not be 
associated  only  with  financial  credit,  as  over-indebtedness  can  result  also  from  other 
obligations  than  financial  debt  and  households  can  be  classed  as  over-indebted  without 
having any financial credit.29  
The impact of household over-indebtedness and insolvencies, and in turn their impact on the 
financial stability and revival of not only households but also financial institutions , has also 
triggered stronger policy discussions about the state of EU legislation on defaults and 
foreclosures. The approach to consumer defaults and foreclosures could also be legislated as 
to be appropriate to the economic conjuncture. Huge losses are ge nerated from the fact that 
foreclosures and evictions  divest otherwise long-term solvent individuals of their homes, 
which are then liquidated at a lower price, leading to the fall of the asset prices and further 
exacerbating the mortgage crisis, or become vacant, which generates costs for the whole  of 
society and does not improve the situation of lenders. Although most of the responsibility 
lies  clearly  with  borrowers and lenders ,  absolving both groups would generate moral 
hazard,  there  is  a  case  for  them  not  being  completely  left  behind  during  exceptional 
economic problems. States should be able to step in to avoid  the long-term consequences of 
short-term income losses, while ensuring that the long-term liability would remain on both 
the borrowers  and lender’s  side.  In  other  terms,  governments  could  provide  guarantees 
redeemable after recovery by the borrowers to avoid excessive dead-weight losses during 
recessions and thus provide necessary macroeconomic stability. Whether this role could or 
should be undertaken under current fiscal constraints is another question. 
Nonetheless,  many  of  the  causes  of  the  recent  credit  expansion  could  not  have  been 
prevented by legislators. It comes as an evident lesson of the crisis that central bankers also 
have part of the responsibility to control asset prices, as regulators and policy-makers are not 
able  to  control  such  phenomena.  Politicians  should  also  rethink  their  encouragement  of 
home ownership as in many instances it has led to asset bubbles and massive uncovered 
liabilities. If home ownership is to be promoted not as a goal per se, but as a social policy to 
stabilise  the  income  of  households  and  to  improve  their  welfare,  then  other  alternatives 
should be considered for lower-income groups that comprise the group of households that 
were previously considered as sub-prime borrowers.  
In addition to posing restrictions, the legislative framework should also be reviewed from 
the perspective of what it should facilitate. For lenders to be able to lend responsibly, they 
need to have access to sufficient information about the consumer and the right to process this 
information in order to make robust creditworthiness assessments on which to base their 
lending  decision.  For  this  purpose,  the  role  of  credit  reporting  systems  should  not  be 
neglected. Well functioning credit reporting systems promote a level playing field among 
creditors  as  more  creditors  have  sufficient  information  about  the  consumer’s 
creditworthiness, which increases consumer choice and mobility. When all creditors have 
sufficient information to lend only to those consumers without excessive debt burden, credit 
reporting directly contributes to preventing household over-indebtedness in society. For the 
legislative  environment to  facilitate  the  necessary  credit  data  access  and  rights  of  use  to 
                                                       
29 Pyykkö, E. (2013), Towards Better Use of Credit Reporting in Europe, Report of ECRI/CEPS Task Force, 
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creditors, not only CCD, MCD, but also data protection legislation should form a consistent 
legislative framework.30 
However, the provisions in the above -mentioned directives can provide only part of the 
many measures needed to prevent excessive household leveraging and facilitate responsible 
lending.  Future financially stable household credit markets need not only  an  effective 
enforcement of EU directives, but also active dialog ue  among market participants. This 
means codes of conduct for creditors and consumer empowerment and financial education 
for households. Consistently, new measures continue to be explored at both national and EU 
level to assist both creditors and borrowers in responsible lending and borrowing. The 
Standing Committee on Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation (SCConFin) of the 
European  Banking  Authority  is  currently  working  on  good  practices  (and  possibly 
guidelines)  on  responsible  lending  and  on  the  treatment  of  borrowers  in  payment 
difficulties. Their work is based on a survey of the Committee’s members undertaken in 
2012,  which  identified  indebtedness  and  responsible  credit,  transparency,  mis-selling  of 
financial products, security, and specific issues such as foreign currency loans and payment 
protection  as  current  supervisory  concerns  regarding  consumer  protection.31  Another 
important set of guidelines has recently been provided by the Financial Stability Board in its 
Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices. 32 These guidelines deal 
with the effective verification of income and other financial information, reasonable debt 
service coverage, appropriate loan -to-value ratios, effective collateral management, and 
prudent use of mortgage insurance. 
Specific guidelines and codes of  conduct also provide an important tool for balancing the 
household credit markets throughout very heterogeneous EU member states. The market 
environments for household credit differ significantly among countries, which is why the 
identification of unambiguous and specific measures for responsible lending and fighting 
excessive  household  leveraging  is  practically  impossible.  Ne vertheless,  this  aspect 
emphasises the role of proper implementation and enforcement of the relevant EU directives 
in the member states.   
                                                       
30 Pyykkö, E. (2013), Towards Better Use of Credit Reporting in Europe, Report of ECRI/CEPS Task Force, 
Centre for European Policy Studies and European Credit Research Institute, Brussels, forthcoming. 
31 EBA (2013), Report on consumer trends – Supervisory concerns regarding consumer protection issues in 2012/13, 
European Banking Authority, 18 March 2013.  
32 FSB (2012), FSB Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices, Financial Stability Board, 
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Annex 
 
Table 1. Individual correlation levels between GDP and interest rates between 2003 and 2012 in 
EU27 
 
Austria Belgium
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.841*** 0.2695*** -0.4297*** -0.2092** -0.5346*** 0.5176*** N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.000 0.003 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000
-0.7309*** -0.184** 0.4849*** 0.2883*** 0.5818*** -0.4674*** N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.000 0.044 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
0.851*** 0.274*** -0.4132*** -0.147 -0.4803*** 0.2276** N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.000 0.003 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.014
Bulgaria Cyprus
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.5923*** 0.863*** 0.554*** 0.5938*** 0.4858*** 0.5523*** -0.3103** -0.4503*** -0.210 -0.3146**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.107 0.014
0.6305*** 0.8505*** 0.8024*** 0.4464*** 0.353*** 0.6104*** -0.142 -0.5973*** 0.285** 0.081
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.279 0.000 0.027 0.538
0.6021*** 0.8805*** 0.5616*** 0.6473*** 0.5456*** 0.5895*** -0.32** -0.5238*** -0.118 -0.2499*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.369 0.054
Czech Republic Germany
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.8495*** 0.3211*** -0.2333** 0.068 -0.2231** -0.039 -0.063 -0.3336*** -0.2772*** -0.4599***
0.000 0.001 0.015 0.482 0.020 0.682 0.494 0.000 0.004 0.000
0.8743*** 0.2156** -0.139 0.067 -0.118 -0.6859*** 0.37*** 0.1897** 0.4224*** 0.1643*
0.000 0.025 0.153 0.493 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.089
0.8758*** 0.2554*** -0.2009** 0.056 -0.1805* -0.7514*** 0.753*** 0.6125*** 0.5337*** 0.4705***
0.000 0.008 0.037 0.564 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Denmark Estonia
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.3604*** -0.1987** -0.2913*** -0.485*** -0.574*** -0.2474* -0.8254*** 0.6203*** -0.7419*** 0.4442***
0.000 0.030 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.6674*** 0.5398*** 0.5988*** 0.2804*** 0.4823*** -0.038 -0.928*** 0.8207*** -0.9207*** 0.206
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.782 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.114
0.4211*** -0.1903** -0.2555*** -0.4354*** -0.5094*** -0.2823** -0.8932*** 0.6547*** -0.8106*** 0.4441***
0.000 0.037 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Greece Spain
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.3446*** 0.2235** -0.3196*** 0.128 -0.2025** 0.8283*** 0.5395*** 0.146 0.4352*** 0.3066***
0.000 0.014 0.000 0.186 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.001
0.6261*** -0.006 -0.120 -0.046 -0.079 0.7377*** 0.6863*** 0.5896*** 0.4561*** 0.5966***
0.000 0.952 0.191 0.640 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4583*** 0.100 -0.2632*** 0.027 -0.1822* 0.851*** 0.574*** 0.1923** 0.4841*** 0.385***
0.000 0.279 0.004 0.779 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000
Finland France
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.6439*** 0.1528* -0.3415*** -0.8158*** -0.8622*** 0.7621*** -0.3302*** -0.2188** -0.135 -0.134
0.000 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.165 0.166
0.7529*** 0.2194** -0.134 -0.6761*** -0.6403*** 0.8077*** -0.027 0.2768*** 0.219** 0.3285***
0.000 0.016 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.772 0.002 0.023 0.001
0.689*** 0.1744* -0.29*** -0.7859*** -0.8174*** 0.7756*** -0.3257*** -0.2016** -0.095 -0.089
0.000 0.057 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.327 0.358
Hungary Ireland
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.321*** -0.6195*** -0.5997*** -0.6273*** -0.5192*** 0.904*** -0.113 0.4473*** 0.012 0.4049***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.220 0.000 0.905 0.000
0.2843*** -0.6157*** -0.5681*** -0.5897*** -0.4608*** 0.448*** -0.282*** 0.5284*** -0.3242*** 0.111
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.254
0.4365*** -0.5137*** -0.562*** -0.4802*** -0.3492*** 0.8928*** -0.138 0.4015*** 0.042 0.434***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.663 0.000
All debt All debt
Consumer 
credit
Consumer 
credit
Housing 
credit
Housing 
credit
All debt All debt
Consumer 
credit
Consumer 
credit
Housing 
credit
Housing 
credit
All debt All debt
Consumer 
credit
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credit
Housing 
credit
Housing 
credit
All debt All debt
Consumer 
credit
Consumer 
credit
Housing 
credit
Housing 
credit
All debt All debt
Consumer 
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Housing 
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Housing 
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All debt All debt
Consumer 
credit
Consumer 
credit
Housing 
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Housing 
credit
All debt All debt
Consumer 
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Consumer 
credit
Housing 
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Housing 
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Note: * p ≤ 0.1 ** p ≤ 0.05 *** p ≤ 0.01 
 
 
 
Italy Lithuania
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.024 -0.4317*** -0.113 -0.4079*** -0.4066*** 0.5706*** 0.7926*** 0.055 0.3991*** -0.434***
0.801 0.000 0.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.592 0.000 0.000
0.2755*** -0.4581*** 0.045 -0.139 0.029 0.7133*** 0.4143*** 0.6093*** -0.035 -0.4904***
0.003 0.000 0.629 0.151 0.768 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.732 0.000
0.1846** -0.4832*** -0.023 -0.3032*** -0.192** 0.5814*** 0.7807*** 0.048 0.4048*** -0.4045***
0.047 0.000 0.805 0.001 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.635 0.000 0.000
Luxembourg Latvia
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.7303*** N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.5644*** 0.8169*** 0.069 0.3494*** -0.144
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.136
0.3842*** N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.7245*** 0.5856*** 0.2796*** 0.106 -0.2633***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.277 0.006
0.8099*** N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.6415*** 0.7308*** 0.142 0.267*** -0.1751*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.144 0.005 0.070
Malta Netherlands
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.7956*** -0.7622*** -0.7657*** -0.139 -0.2305* 0.8265*** N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7666*** -0.8008*** -0.81*** 0.4498*** 0.3757*** 0.2216** N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7906*** -0.7506*** -0.7637*** -0.056 -0.148 0.7966*** N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.671 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Poland Portugal
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.9084*** 0.3053*** -0.2374** -0.4081*** -0.7315*** 0.3027*** 0.4954*** 0.103 0.4524*** 0.150
0.000 0.003 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.121
0.8873*** 0.3091*** -0.2148** -0.3521*** -0.675*** 0.4328*** 0.4267*** -0.011 0.6297*** 0.4019***
0.000 0.002 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.909 0.000 0.000
0.9035*** 0.2898*** -0.3231*** -0.3952*** -0.7726*** 0.3483*** 0.449*** 0.058 0.4744*** 0.1919**
0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.529 0.000 0.047 0.000
Romania Sweden
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.3177*** 0.091 -0.2591** -0.117 -0.5091*** 0.7903*** 0.2932*** -0.074 0.387*** 0.067
0.002 0.446 0.028 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.489 0.000 0.532
0.3691*** 0.7097*** 0.3619*** 0.449*** -0.031 0.7323*** 0.2178** -0.119 0.1826* -0.121
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.799 0.000 0.040 0.267 0.087 0.258
0.2146** -0.2918** -0.6481*** -0.2679** -0.4975*** 0.7692*** 0.095 -0.2755*** 0.127 -0.2315**
0.039 0.013 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.375 0.009 0.237 0.029 0.000
Slovenia Slovakia
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real 
Consumer 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.6426*** 0.4529*** -0.4944*** 0.4337*** -0.4287*** 0.7485*** 0.4742*** -0.7436*** 0.3286*** -0.2789**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.010
0.8464*** 0.7181*** 0.002 0.5273*** -0.050 0.7234*** 0.4463*** -0.6948*** 0.4287*** -0.104
0.000 0.000 0.988 0.000 0.610 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.348
0.5661*** 0.3665*** -0.5699*** 0.409*** -0.4581*** 0.7498*** 0.499*** -0.7771*** 0.3274*** -0.3158***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003
United Kingdom
GDP
Consumer 
APRC
Housing 
APRC
Real Cons. 
APRC
Real Housing 
APRC
0.2439*** N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.008
0.077 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.413
0.4738*** N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.000
All debt
Consumer 
credit
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credit
All debt All debt
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credit
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Figure 11. Real household debt (left scale) and debt to GDI income (right scale) in EU27 
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Consumer loans 
Housing loans 
Other loans 
Leverage to Gross Disposable Income 
(right scale) 
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and ECRI. 
Note: Debt amounts (left scale) are in constant thousands of 2010 euros. Leverage (right scale) is a 
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